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STEVENS N. FUENTES,
Petitioner, -versus- THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE
Respondents. |
G.R. No. 139618 Present: pUNO, J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, AZCUNA, and GARCIA, JJ. Promulgated: |
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SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
J.:
Once a criminal action has been instituted by the filing of
the Information with the court, the latter acquires jurisdiction and has the
authority to determine whether to dismiss the case or convict or acquit the
accused. However, the court, in the exercise
of its judicial discretion, cannot ignore the recommendation of the
prosecution. Hence, where the prosecution
is convinced that the evidence is insufficient to establish the guilt of an
accused, it cannot be faulted for moving for the withdrawal of the Information.
However, in granting or denying the motion
to withdraw, the court must judiciously evaluate the evidence in the hands of
the prosecution.
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to annul and
set aside the Resolution[1]
dated
The instant case stemmed from a Deed of Sale entered into
by and between Teresita Sta. Maria Raco and the P114,155.00 for the lot.
When the contract was presented to the Register of Deeds of
Aklan, he required the submission of a resolution from the Sangguniang Bayan
of Banga authorizing petitioner to purchase the lot.
On
In order to avoid any controversy, Teresita
Sta. Maria Raco returned to petitioner the amount paid
for her lot. That same day, petitioner
executed an Affidavit of Rescission of Contract of Sale.
On
In a Resolution dated
However,
then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto disapproved the recommendation and, in a
marginal note, stated that “the offense of violation of R.A. 3019, Section 3
(g) was consummated from the signing of the contract by the parties.”
Accordingly, on
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which reads:
That
on or about July 12, 1995, in Banga, Aklan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public
officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of Banga, Aklan, committing the crime
herein in relation to, while in the performance and taking advantage of his
official functions, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally
cause the purchase of a 1,343 sq.m. parcel of land
situated in Mangan, Banga, Aklan from one Teresita
Sta. Maria Raco for and in consideration of the amount of PESOS: ONE HUNDRED
FOURTEEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FIFTY-FIVE (P114, 155.00), which contract
or transaction is manifestly or gross disadvantageous to the government said
accused knowing fully well that the said property has a fair market value of
PESOS: TWO THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED TWENTY and 30/100 (P2,820.30) and a
zonal value of PESOS: THIRTEEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY (P13,450.00).
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
On
The Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan
a Motion to Withdraw Information “for insufficiency of evidence.”
On
The
motion at bar now is for the withdrawal of the information on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence. As argued by the private complainant, however,
quoting the Ombudsman, the offense for which the accused was charged “xxx is
consummated upon the signing of the contract by the parties xxx.” A perusal of
the records would seem that this ground of insufficiency of evidence may not
hold water.
Besides, and more importantly, the matter of determining the sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence, is best addressed to the Court after the prosecution has determined the existence of the prima facie case upon the filing of the Information.[5]
On
On
Anent
the first ground, that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, a
cursory reading of the allegations in the Information clearly show that the
facts alleged therein constitute an offense for violation of Sec. 3 (g), R.A.
3019.
Anent the second ground that there is clearly no prima facie evidence against the accused, the same is evidentiary in nature and is not a ground for the quashal of an information. Besides, as ruled earlier, the matter of determining the sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence is best addressed to the Court after the Ombudsman has determined the existence of prima facie case on the filing of the Information.[6]
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but
this was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its
Resolution of
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari.
The sole issue for our resolution is whether the
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in denying petitioner’s Motion to Quash the Information.
In its Comment on the petition, respondent People of the
In his Comment, the Solicitor General, representing the Sandiganbayan, prayed that the instant petition be given
due course and that the challenged Resolutions be set aside. The Solicitor General stated:
Contrary to established jurisprudence, respondent court merely relied on the self-serving allegation of the private complainant that the offense for which petitioner was charged “[was] consummated upon the signing of the contract by the parties.”
x x x x x x x x x
Here, we submit that petitioner was denied due process when respondent court merely accepted the private complainant’s word as to the sufficiency of the evidence against the petitioner. By doing so, it relinquished the discretion that it was duty bound to exercise. x x x
It is highly unusual for the Solicitor General to take a
position adverse to the People or the Sandiganbayan
he is representing. Generally, the
Solicitor General has the duty to see to it that the interest of the government
is upheld within the limits set by law.[7] It bears emphasis that in a prosecution for
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as in this case, the
government is the offended party.
As early as US v. Valencia,[8]
this Court, through Justice Charles A. Willard, ruled that once an Information
has been filed in court, the latter acquires jurisdiction over the case; and,
accordingly, it is the court, not the fiscal, which has control over it. In US v. Barredo,[9] this
Court explained that fiscals are not clothed with the power to dismiss or nolle prosequi
criminal actions once these have been instituted, for the power to dismiss is
solely vested in the court. The Barredo doctrine has continuously been applied
through the years.[10] In other words, once a court acquires
jurisdiction, the same continues until the termination of the case.[11] The rule, therefore, in this jurisdiction is
that once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the
case, whether it be dismissal or the conviction or the acquittal of the accused,
rests in the sound discretion of the court.[12] The only qualification to this exercise of
the judicial prerogative is that the substantial rights of the accused must not
be impaired[13] nor the
People be deprived of the right to due process.[14]
This brings us to this basic issue in the instant case,
that is, how that judicial discretion should be exercised.
We hold that the exercise of judicial discretion, with
respect to a motion to withdraw the Information filed by the prosecution, is
not limited to the mere approval or disapproval of the stand taken by the
prosecution. The court must itself be
convinced that there is indeed no sufficient evidence against the accused and
this conclusion can only be reached after an assessment of the evidence in the
possession of the prosecution. What is required is the court’s own assessment
of such evidence.[15]
Here, the Sandiganbayan failed to
make its own appraisal of the prosecution’s evidence in Criminal Case No. 23334. As aptly observed by the Solicitor General,
the Sandiganbayan merely accepted the private
complainant’s word that the evidence against petitioner is sufficient. This is glaringly clear from its Resolution
dated August 17, 1998 stating that it relied upon the arguments of the private
complainant, and its Resolution of April 26, 1999 holding that “a mere cursory
reading of the allegations in the Information clearly shows that the facts
alleged therein show an offense for
violation of Sec. 3(g), R.A. 3019.” Significantly, these Resolutions contain
no evaluation of the evidence for the prosecution for the purpose of
determining whether the Motion to Withdraw the Information filed by the
prosecution and Motion to Quash the Information filed by herein petitioner
should be granted or denied.
In Mosquera v.
Panganiban,[16] the
trial court failed to state a good reason for the withdrawal of the Information. We
held that the exercise of the trial court’s discretion is neither just nor
fair. The ruling in Mosquera
is applicable to the instant case. It
bears reiterating that the Sandiganbayan merely relied
on the arguments of private complainant. Thus, it relinquished its discretion it was
duty bound to exercise.
In sum, we find that the Sandiganbayan,
in issuing the challenged Resolutions denying the Ombudsman’s Motion to
Withdraw Information, gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated
SO ORDERED.
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate
Justice Chairperson |
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RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice |
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CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice |
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I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, p. 39. Penned by Associate Justice Godofredo L. Legaspi with Associate Justice Edilberto G. Sandoval and Associate Justice Alfredo J. Gustilo, concurring.
[2]
[3] Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
[4] Rollo, pp. 41-42.
[5]
[6]
[7] Orbos
v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 92561,
[8] 1
Phil. 642 (1903).
[9] 32
Phil. 444 (1915).
[10] See
for instance, US v. Abanzado, 37 Phil. 658
(1917); Kwong Sing v. The City of
[11] Hoey v.
Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, G.R. Nos. 61323-24, June 29, 1984, 130 SCRA
239; Republic v. Sunga, G.R. No. 38634, June
20, 1988, 162 SCRA 191, citing Crespo v.
Mogul, 151 SCRA 462 (1987).
[12] Crespo v.
Mogul, G.R. No. 53373,
[13] People
v. Zabala, 58 O.G. 5028.
[14] Galman v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 72670,
[15]
[16] G.R. No. 121180,